Attrition Modeling in the Presence of Decoys:  An Operations-other-than-war Motivation by Gaver, D.P. & Jacobs, P.A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
1997
Attrition Modeling in the Presence of
Decoys:  An Operations-other-than-war Motivation
Gaver, D.P.
Gaver, D.P. and Jacobs, P.A.Attrition Modeling in the Presence of Decoys:  An
Operations-other-than-war Motivation," Naval Research Logistics, 44 (1997), 507-514.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38176
Attrition Modeling in the Presence of Decoys:
An Operations-other-than-War Motivation
D.P. Gaver, P.A. Jacobs
Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California 93943
Received July 1995; revised January 1997; accepted 10 January 1997
Abstract: Under various operational conditions, in particular in operations other than war
(OOTW) or peacekeeping, an intervening force, here Blue, must occasionally engage in
attrition warfare with an opposing force, here Red, that is intermingled with noncombatants.
Desirably, Red armed actives are targeted, and not the unarmed noncombatants. This article
describes some simple Lanchesterian attrition models that reflect a certain capacity of Blue
to discriminate noncombatants from armed and active Red opponents. An explicit extension
of the Lanchester square law results: Blue’s abstinence concerning the indiscriminate shoot-
ing of civilians mixed with Red’s is essentially reflected in a lower Blue rate of fire and
less advantageous exchange rate. The model applies to other situations involving decoys,
and reflects the value of a discrimination capability. q 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval
Research Logistics 44: 507–514, 1997
1. INTRODUCTION
Mutual attrition on the battlefield has classically been modeled without accounting for
the possible presence of false targets: decoys of low military value intended to divert
opponent fire, or even the deliberate dispersal of unarmed civilians among armed and active
combatants. The latter is a situation that might well occur in the operations other than war
(OOTW) scenarios anticipated as one of the major regional contingencies (MRCs) types
into which the U.S. or joint forces could be drawn.
The issue to be addressed herein is that of understanding how Red actives’ use of decoys,
for example, civilians, for cover, influences Blue’s capability to inflict attrition upon Red
armed active forces, and at what expense in terms of Blue’s own attrition and the inadvertent
attrition inflicted, or wasted, upon such decoys. Clearly, attrition of human decoys is to be
strenuously avoided for humanitarian reasons, but also because of its broad impact on world
opinion; in some circumstances such attrition might well inflame resistance to the extent
that the civilian population could itself become an active threat. But in order for Blue to
avoid killing Red-controlled civilians, or less politically sensitive targets, that is, to avoid
wasting time and resources that could otherwise be directed toward targeting Red actives,
some sacrifice in Blue effectiveness must be accepted.
We provide here a preliminary set of simple models for quantifying the effect of substitut-
ing discrimination for pure attrition when false targets are present. It will be seen that the
q 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0894-069X/97/050507-08
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effect of accounting for target discrimination power by Blue can be reduced to an explicit
formula that generalizes the classical Lanchesterian square law. Elaboration to include more
realistic detail induces the need for more ambitious numerical work, but the latter is not
formidable. Addition of various Blue force and Red decoy types, Blue (inanimate/nonhu-
man) decoys, stochastics, and the aforementioned change of affiliation by Red (or Blue:
slaughter of Red civilians by Blue forces may induce the latter to either slacken their attack,
or stimulate greater Red resistance) can all be modeled and ultimately quantified.
2. INITIAL, AND SIMPLEST, FORMULATION
Let
Ra( t)  number of Red active, attrition-capable, armed military forces at time t;
Rc( t)  number of Red unarmed civilians or other decoys mixed with the above at t;
B( t)  number of Blue active armed forces at t .
In what follows it is clearly necessary to require that B( t) , Ra( t) , and Rc( t) all be nonnega-
tive; otherwise nonsense results occur. The attrition equations are thus nonlinear.
Mechanism of combat: Red actives deplete the Blue actives according to the Lanchester
so-called aimed-fire (square-law) equation
dB
dt
 0rRB( t)Ra( t) . (1)
The Blue actives attempt to do the same, but must avoid killing civilians, or generally being
diverted by decoys.
2.1. Blue Shoots at First Available Red
If a Blue simply picks a target Red at random then, assuming military and civilians are
well mixed and appear to the Blues in proportion to their numbers, Blue targets an active
Red with success probability sa( t)  Ra( t) / [Ra( t) / Rc( t)] , so
dRa
dt
 0rBR( t)sa( t)B( t)  0rBR( t)F Ra( t)Ra( t) / Rc( t) GB( t) . (2)
Note that it is to Blue’s immediate selfish advantage to discriminate between Red actives
and civilians, for in the above Ra( t) / [Ra( t) / Rc( t)] can well be considerably less than
unity, in which case Blue only slowly reduces those shooting at him/her. Red civilians are
targeted with probability 1 0 sa( t)  sc( t) ; the results may be quite unacceptable from
Blue’s viewpoint, and certainly from that of Red. This is a low-resolution model: differentia-
tion between Blue force types, and coordination of fire capabilities, are important in practice
but not addressed here. The payoff is a rather explicit analytical result.
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2.2. Blue Possesses Discriminatory Powers
Suppose Blue discriminates between Red actives and Red civilians: iaa is the probability
that Blue can identify a Red active if he acquires one; iac is the probability that he misidenti-
fies it as a decoy (civilian); ica , the probability that a decoy (civilian) is mistaken for an
active, and icc , the probability of correct identification of a decoy (civilian) , are defined
correspondingly. We hope that iaa and icc are near unity, but there may be a substantial cost
in time for this capability. Now Ra( t) iaa is the (approximate) number of Red actives
correctly identified at t , whereas Ra( t) iac is the number incorrectly classed as civilians and
not shot at, and Rc( t) ica is the number of civilians targeted through misclassification error.
We suppose that each Red active or civilian requires a unit of service per unit of time and
the service is processor sharing. Then Ra( t) iaa / [Ra( t) iaa / Ra( t) iac / Rc( t) ica / Rc( t) icc]
is the fraction of time slice dt spent correctly shooting at Red actives, so
dRa( t)
dt
 0rBR( t) Ra( t) iaa( t)Ra( t)( iaa( t) / iac( t)) / Rc( t)( ica( t) / icc( t)) B( t)
 0rBR( t) Ra( t) iaa( t)B( t)Ra( t) / Rc( t) . (3)
The above holds because iaa/ iac 1, ica/ icc 1. Notice that the identification probabilities
icc , et cetera could be made time dependent to represent changes in visibility throughout
the conflict. We can also write the attrition equation for decoys, or civilians:
dRc( t)
dt
 0rBR( t) Rc( t) ica( t)Ra( t) / Rc( t) B( t) . (4)
The above formulations assume that the Red actives and civilians are well mixed and
hence equally likely to be found by a Blue active; however, once found, a candidate target
can be assessed for relevance, but with error. For now we slough off the time-consuming
aspects of this process. A model with more states can handle this aspect; see Section 3.
Comment. A possible alternative formulation, pointed out by R.L. Helmbold, treats
classification in a Bayesian fashion, that is, by treating Ra( t) / [Ra( t) / Rc( t)] effectively
as Blue’s prior for a Red active; hence the denominators in the fractions in (3) and (4)
are replaced by Ra( t) iaa / Rc( t) ica . From our modeling perspective, this model would
neglect the time spent by Blue actually scanning and misclassifying the fraction iac of
actives, and correctly classifying the fraction icc civilian decoys. In effect, Blue effort is
viewed in (3) as in part processor shared over all Red units. If we choose to neglect this
time-expenditure penalty we can indeed alter our equations: the steps leading to (8) follow
as shown, while later expressions are modified.
To move toward actual solutions, divide (3) by (4):
dRa
dt
dRc
dt

0rBR( t) Ra( t) iaa( t)Ra( t) / Rc( t) B( t)
0rBR( t) Rc( t) ica( t)Ra( t) / Rc( t) B( t)
 Ra( t) iaa( t)
Rc( t) ica( t)
. (5)
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So upon division
(dRa /dt)
Ra( t) Y (dRc /dt)Rc( t)  iaa( t) / ica( t) . (6)
For simplicity drop the i time dependency; easy explicit integration gives
ln Ra( t) 0 ln Ra(0)  S iaaicaD( ln Rc( t) 0 ln Rc(0)) . (7)
From this,
Rc( t)  Rc(0)r(Ra( t) /Ra(0)) ica / iaa . (8)
Now plug this into Eq. (3):
dRa( t)
dt
 0rBR( t) Ra( t) iaaB( t)Ra( t) / Rc(0)(Ra( t) /Ra(0)) ica / iaa . (9)
Equations (1) and (9) constitute a pair of nonlinear first-order differential equations that
can be routinely solved numerically, subject to initial and boundary conditions: 0 ¡ Ra( t) ,
B( t) ¡ B(0) . Closed-form analytical solutions are practically inaccessible, but further
information can be found. Divide (9) by (1): we come up with an equation that relates
B( t) and Ra( t) that can be integrated explicitly. We see that a generalized square law
appears.
Proceed to solve for Ra in terms of B :
dRa /dt
dB /dt

0rBR( t) Ra( t) iaaB( t)Ra( t) / (Rc(0)/Ra(0) ica / iaa )(Ra( t)) ica / iaa
0rRB( t)Ra( t) . (10)
We rearrange and get
(Ra( t) / (Rc(0)/(Ra(0)) ica / iaa )(Ra( t)) ica / iaa ) dRa( t)  rBR( t)
rRB( t)
iaaB( t) dB( t) . (11)
Assume that rBR( t) /rRB( t) is independent of t and integrate to get, finally,
R 2a( t)
2
0 R
2
a(0)
2
/ S Rc(0)(Ra(0)) ica / iaaDF Ra( t)
( i
ca
/ i
aa
)/1
( ica / iaa) / 1 0
Ra(0) ( ica / iaa )/1
( ica / iaa) / 1 G
 rBR
rRB
iaaF B 2( t)2 0 B
2(0)
2 G . (12)
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This is a generalized square law, valid when positive boundary conditions are respected.
Notice that if Rc(0)  0 we are back to the original square law, immortalized in song and
story; see, for instance, [3] . If Rc(0)  0 but ica  iaa we also have a new and somewhat
different square law. Anderson [1] has also considered the influence of decoys or false
targets in a more elaborate setting. His formulation differs from ours in that discrimination
capability is not represented by functions iaa , ica (and their respective complements) .
ILLUSTRATION 1: ica  iaa , Rc(0)  Ra(0) .
This is a pessimistic case for Blue, who has no discriminatory power. But the result is
simple:
R 2a( t)
2
0 R
2
a(0)
2
/ F R 2a( t)2 0 R
2
a(0)
2 G  rBRrRB iaaF B
2( t)
2
0 B
2(0)
2 G
or
R 2a(0) 0 R 2a( t)  SrBRrRBDS iaa2 D[B 2(0) 0 B 2( t)] , (13)
which is a new square-law result.
The above is precisely the same equation that would occur if there were no civilians
(Rc(0)  0), but with rBR , the effective attrition rate of Blue versus Red, replaced—
reduced—to rBRiaa /2. In this case the presence of civilians or decoys has diluted the Blue
force’s effectiveness by iaa /2, that is, by at least a factor of 2. Furthermore, civilians are
still getting targeted and presumably killed, because ica iaa , which, it is hoped, is unrealistic
in practice. This disadvantage must be overcome by sharpening Blue’s perception so as to
reduce ica well below iaa , which would allow return (nearly) to classical attrition formulas.
Otherwise, more Blue forces would be needed to achieve desired results.
ILLUSTRATION 2: ica  0.
This is optimistic for Red civilian noncombatants: they are never targeted. Note that (12)
becomes
R 2a(0)
2
0 R
2
a( t)
2
/ Rc(0)[Ra(0) 0 Ra( t)]  rBR
rRB
iaaF B 2(0)2 0 B
2( t)
2 G . (14)
From this it is apparent that the surviving Red attacker number, Ra( t) , increases with
Rc(0) , initial decoy supply, as is intuitive: the presence of Red decoys still interferes with
Blue’s effectiveness, even though none are actually engaged.
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Table 1. Time until attrition reduces force to 85% of its initial value.
50 red civilians. rBR  rRB  0.1.
Time until 85% of initial force
Initial forces 85% of initial forces are attrited
iaa Red actives Blue Red actives Blue Red actives Blue Winner
1 100 100 85 85 2.6 1.6 Red
1 100 110 85 93.5 2.3 1.8 Red
1 100 120 85 102 2.1 1.9 Red
1 100 130 85 110.5 1.9 2.2 Blue
0.8 100 130 85 110.5 2.4 2.1 Red
0.8 100 140 85 119 2.2 2.3 Blue
Numerical Examples
Table 1 presents results of numerically solving equations (1) , (2) , and (4). The MAT-
LAB [4] version 4.0, fourth- and fifth-order Runge–Kutta–Fehlberg numerical integration
method was used. Table 1 displays the times until attrition reduces the Red active force to
85% of its initial value and times until attrition reduces the Blue active force to 85% of its
initial value. In all cases the initial number of Red actives is 100 and the initial number of
Red civilians is 50. The attrition parameters rRB  rBR  0.1. Blue always classifies Red
civilians correctly; icc  1.
The side that reaches 85% of its initial forces first is considered the loser. Even if Blue
has perfect classification of active Reds, iaa  1, Blue needs more than 20 additional forces
to be the winner when there are 50 Red civilians in the area. Furthermore, if Blue does not
have perfect classification, iaa  0.8, then Blue needs more than 30 additional forces to be
the winner.
To compensate for likely variability of outcome and uncertainty, Blue force size to
guarantee winning will very likely be much larger than in the above table.
3. ALTERNATIVE SEEKER–ATTRITER CONFLICT FORMULATIONS
A more realistic, but also more complex problem formulation explicitly distinguishes
between Blue seekers and Blue actives: the former locate Red units, while the latter attack/
attrit those Reds detected and then identified (possibly incorrectly) as actives. We define
Ra f ( t)  number of Red actives that are free (undetected by Blue) at time t;
Rad( t)  number of Red actives that are detected by Blue at time t;
Rcf ( t)  number of Red civilians (or decoys) free at time t;
Rcd( t)  number of Red civilians (or decoys) detected (erroneously) at t;
Bs( t)  number of Blue seekers at time t;
Ba( t)  number of Blue actives at time t .
Various issues add to the modeling choices possible; we explore examples only. Specifically,
here Blue seekers are modeled as detectors of Reds, but not as followers or trackers: Once
a Blue seeker makes contact with a Red it puts it into a detected pool that is available for
Blue active attack, but the Blue seeker becomes quickly free again. A plausible alternative
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is that a Blue seeker identifies and labels and binds to a Red until the latter is attacked or
released (contact is lost) . We omit consideration of this option for the present.
There follow the state transition equations:
dRa f ( t)
dt

0jBR(a)Ra f ( t)Bs( t)
free active reds detected
by blue seekers
/ ldf (a)Rad( t)
Detected active reds’
track lost ( freed)
, (15)
dRad( t)
dt
 jBR(a)Ra f ( t)Bs( t)
free active reds detected
0 ldf (a)Rad( t)
detected active
reds freed
0
rBR
Rad( t) iaa
Rad( t) / Rcd( t) Ba( t)
detected active
reds attrited
, (16)
dRcf ( t)
dt

0jBR(c)Rcf ( t)Bs( t)
civilian /decoy
red detected
/ ldf ( c)Rcd( t)
civilian /decoy
red track lost ( freed)
, (17)
dRcd( t)
dt
 jBR(c)Rcf ( t)Bs( t)
civilian /decoy
red detected
0 ldf ( c)Rcd( t)
civilian /decoy
red track lost
0
rBR
Rcd( t) ica
Rad( t) / Rcd( t) Ba( t)
detected civilian /decoy
red attrited (mistakenly)
, (18)
dBs( t)
dt

0rRB(s)(Ra f ( t) / Rad( t))
blue seeker attrited by
red actives
, (19)
dBa( t)
dt

0rRB(a)(Ra f ( t) / Rad( t))
blue active attrited by
red actives
. (20)
In the above jBR(a) is the parameter governing the rate at which a Blue seeker discovers
a free Red active; jBR(c) is the corresponding rate of Blue seeker discovery of Red civilian
or decoy.
The condition that all state variables be nonnegative must be respected when solving
(15) – (20); numerical solution is the only practical option. The rate parameters are self-
explanatory; if desired any or all of these may be made time dependent.
4. SUMMARY DISCUSSION
The simple models proposed above account in an explicit way for a significant combat
phenomenon: the influence of false targets or decoys upon a (Blue) combatant’s attritional
effectiveness. They incorporate discrimination power (probability) parameters ( iaa , icc) that
represent the capacity of Blue to correctly identify Red decoys, or, in another interpretation,
the capacity of Red to confuse and divert Blue. It is hoped that our article will stimulate
further investigation in this important military area, which is of considerable current interest:
it investigates a specific aspect of what is presently called information warfare.
930 / 8m12$$0930 06-05-97 23:58:14 nra W: Nav Res
514 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 44 (1997)
4.1. Related Work
A referee has observed a similarity between this article’s models and those previously
introduced by Taylor [3] , and subsequently discussed by Roberts and Conolly [2] . The
similarity is that the latter model also stipulates two force types (analogous to our Red,
however, for them both are active and attrition capable) , versus one (our Blue). But our
emphasis differs in that explicit attention is paid to the uncertainty with which the single
force (our Blue) can actually determine which Red force type element is currently a possible
target. Discrimination parameters (alternatively, a confusion matrix) are introduced to ex-
plicitly represent the degree with which the Blue force can avoid being tricked by Red.
This feature might desirably be introduced into the Taylor–Roberts and Conolly models;
as they now stand [see (1) of Roberts and Conolly] their formulation takes no explicit
account of which Red type Blue is likely to be targeting; on a modern battlefield this is an
important current issue. Optimization could be carried out with respect to real-time targeting
as well as by choice of initial force size.
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